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Intersubjectivity is a concept central to human interaction, broadly understood as the sharing 
of minds. There is a rich diversity of conceptualizations of intersubjectivity, but detailed 
operationalization for its component processes in social interactions are scarce. We propose 
a novel approach to examine detailed variation in intersubjectivity in interaction. Our 
approach combines two previously formulated frameworks: the hierarchically organized 
developmental levels of intersubjectivity put forth in the field of developmental psychology, 
and three domains or orders of social interaction – affect, deontics, and epistemics – 
discussed in conversation analytic research literature. The interdisciplinary integration 
of these two frameworks allows a more crystallized view of intersubjectivity, which will 
benefit our understanding of the fine-scale social interaction processes as they vary in the 
course of the moment-to-moment unfolding of social action, across different stages of 
human social development, and between individuals belonging to different clinical groups 
and even to different species.
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Introduction 
Intersubjectivity is often highlighted as the crucial difference between 
humans and nonhumans. Consequently, intersubjectivity is of major interest 
in philosophy, cognitive neuroscience, psychology, linguistics, and human 
evolution (e.g., Crosley, 1996; Praetorius, 2010; Rochat, et al., 2009; Tomasello 
and Rakoczy, 2003) – let alone in research on social interaction, language, 
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and communication (Fusaroli, et al., 2014; Heritage, 1984; Schiffrin, 1990). 
Yet, there is a lack of an agreed-upon operationalization of its component 
processes in social interactions at a detailed level. In this paper, we formulate 
a synthesis of two views on intersubjectivity that thus far are dealt with 
in separate fields of research: adult interactions in conversation analytic 
research, and developmental psychology research on the development 
of infant interactions. While they are not always seamlessly compatible 
in terms of conceptualizations of intersubjectivity (see below), we believe 
that synthesizing certain elements in these approaches will yield beneficial 
insights into intersubjectivity that have wider applicability. 
In what follows, we will first very briefly discuss various conceptualizations 
of intersubjectivity. Then, we will summarize the developmental psychology 
view on intersubjectivity, more specifically by using the oft-used levels 
of intersubjectivity, formulated as a hierarchical, nested structure based 
on the early human infant development (Rochat, et al., 2009; Trevarthen, 
1998; Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001). We will briefly review the central cognitive 
and emotional processes at each developmental level (for longer treatments, 
see e.g., Rochat, et al., 2009; Zahavi & Rochat, 2015). Thereafter, we discuss 
the second approach, which deals with three domains of social interaction, 
which have been previously discussed from the conversation-analytic 
viewpoint, with a specific focus on the interpretation of action in interaction 
(Stevanovic and Peräkylä, 2014) but which will now be applied to discuss 
intersubjective processes more generally. Then, we intersect the “level” and 
“domain” approaches to outline what we consider as the core processes of 
intersubjectivity. The synthesis of these two frameworks will benefit our 
understanding of the fine-scale social interaction processes as they vary 
in the course of the moment-to-moment unfolding of social action, across 
different stages of human social development, and between individuals 
belonging to different clinical groups and even to different species. 
Our central thesis is that intersubjectivity is not a monolithic phenomenon but 
a synthesis of different components, each of which may be present to a greater 
or lesser extent during a single interaction episode. Identification of this 
variation yields a better understanding and a more concrete description 
of the otherwise somewhat intangible notion of intersubjectivity.
What is Intersubjectivity? 
Intersubjectivity as a notion has been used in many different fields of 
inquiry: sociology, philosophy, psychology, and anthropology, where it refers 
to the inherently social nature of human existence. While all conceptualizations 
of intersubjectivity involve a characterization of the relationship between 
Self and the Other, the literature enables us to identify different foci 
of emphasis regarding the main locus of intersubjective processes. 
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According to some conceptualizations of intersubjectivity, it appears as 
a transpersonal phenomenon. Intersubjectivity refers to the field of primordial, 
maternal reality, which has been conceived of as an “all-engulfing continent” 
in relation to subjective experience; “it is the experience of a welcoming, 
nourishing soil, in which otherness emerges as a constituent of subjective 
experiences, not through opposition or confrontation but through its character 
of primordial inclusion” (Coelho & Figueiredo, 2003: 199). Here, the starting 
point for the consideration of intersubjectivity is the total indifferentiation 
between Self and the Other. Heidegger (1962 [1927]) talked about us being 
thrown into a form of implicit understanding of the world, where we have no 
choice. This implicit understanding, which is always made up of our different 
subjective experiences and our possibilities for interpreting the objects with 
which we come in contact, ends up constituting us in the context of a tradition. 
In this sense, we always live under the control of the impersonal – a field 
of possibilities that establishes and delimits the conditions of our experience 
and the possibilities of our actions. It is the tradition that precedes us and 
surrounds us, and it must be understood as something that makes me come 
to be what I am. From this point of view, intersubjectivity has been claimed 
to involve a mode of participation in the natural and material world that does 
not even require an immediately perceivable human presence (Duranti, 2010; 
Schutz, 1962). Our perception of the world is something that human presence 
and human labor has already transformed into a “cultural world.” In a similar 
vein, Merleau-Ponty (1962) emphasized the primordial nature of bodily 
interactions, describing how we predate any earliest aspect of self-awareness, 
so that we find ourselves immersed in interactive and intercorporeal processes 
already before any primordial forms of social understanding take place 
(Gallagher, 2011: 65).
While intersubjectivity is necessarily learned through interactions with other 
people, all this is afforded by the developing brain capacity and the inherently 
social predispositions that allow the learning. Thus, in traditional developmental 
and comparative psychology, intersubjectivity has been typically considered as 
an intrapersonal phenomenon – an emergent property of the emotion-cognitive 
capacities of the developing human mind, of which some are present already 
in neonates. For example, there is much literature emphasizing the born-with 
tendency of human neonates to orient to faces and interact with others through 
smiles and vocal exchanges (e.g., Csibra, 2010; Rochat, et al., 2009, Rochat 
& Passos-Ferreira, 2009; Trevarthen, 1979). As these tendencies get fed by 
repeated interactions, they build the sense of intersubjective understanding 
through shared experiences. According to the so-called bodily mimesis 
argument (Zlatev, 2008), these primordial forms of intersubjectivity ground 
the development of language, which in turn boosts the development 
of intersubjectivity to even higher levels. Hence, at the same time 
as the development of intersubjectivity is strongly dependent on early social 
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interactions (see especially Reddy, 2003; Rochat, 2007; Rogoff, 1999; Vogel, 
et al., 2002), the intrapersonal perspective to intersubjectivity is centered around 
those primordial human social capacities that precede the structures of social 
interaction.
In yet other conceptualizations of intersubjectivity, the phenomenon is 
seen, not as the precondition for the interpersonal sphere to emerge, but rather, 
as those very interactional processes in and through which the interpersonal 
sphere is brought publicly into being. Here, intersubjectivity refers to the field 
of relations constructed in and through the interactions between individuals 
and may thus be considered as an interactional phenomenon – even if, 
paradoxically, individuals’ taken-for-granted assumptions about an already 
existing intersubjectivity play a major role in helping them to actually achieve 
it (Rommetveit, 1976: 204). Within this conceptualization, we may further 
distinguish between two different ways of emphasizing the interactional 
processes most relevant for the achievement of intersubjectivity. First, from 
the perspective of enactivism, intersubjectivity is achieved in and through 
a dynamical interactional process of coordination where the resulting emergent 
patterns of coordination acquire meaning over and above the meaning 
of the individual actions (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007; Fuchs & De Jaegher, 
2009; Gallagher, 2011; Gallagher & Hutto, 2008). In this view, any interactional 
behavior by which participants coordinate or co-regulate their individual 
interactional contributions renders itself to the analysis of intersubjectivity 
(see e.g., Condon, 1979; Issartel, et al., 2007). Second, from the perspective 
of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, intersubjectivity is achieved 
in and through a set of commonly used normative practices by which actions 
and stances can be composed in an intelligible way (Heritage, 1984; Rae, 
1994; Schegloff, 2007; Wilkinson, 1999). In this view, social interaction is 
embedded in what Goffman (1983) referred to as the “interaction order” – the 
relatively stable regularities and structures of social interaction, which should be 
treated “as a substantive domain in its own right” (Goffman, 1983: 2).
As seen above, all conceptualizations of intersubjectivity involve, not 
only a characterization of the relationship between Self and the Other, but also 
a view of the type of processes that, in each case, underlie that relationship. 
These different approaches may on the outset appear rather incompatible. 
Yet, we argue they do not have to be. In this paper, we will mostly resort 
to the interactional conceptualization of intersubjectivity, including both 
the “processual” and “structural” emphases found in the literature 
(see De Jaegher, et al., 2016). We selected this perspective because our 
aim is to aid future empirical research by describing observable indicators 
of intersubjectivity, while also outlining a possible bridge between human 
adult interactions and interactions with human infants. At the same time, 
however, we maintain that the interactional processes that underlie 
the achievement of intersubjectivity are deeply rooted in individuals’ 
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emotional-cognitive capacities, such as Theory of Mind skills, and we are 
therefore particularly interested in how these capacities become manifest 
at the level of social interaction. Thus, our account also draws strongly from 
the developmental psychological literature, where intersubjectivity is largely 
discussed with reference to its intrapersonal characteristics. Furthermore, 
some other aspects of our framework, such as the one highlighting the role of 
language in shaping individuals’ intersubjective orientations (see below), 
also align with the idea of intersubjectivity as a transpersonal phenomenon.
The levels of intersubjectivity
In a framework used in cognitive and developmental psychology 
literature, intersubjectivity is organized into a sequence of levels of increasing 
cognitive and interactional sophistication (Rochat, et al., 2009; Trevarthen, 
1979). Intersubjectivity is dependent on the increasing cognitive capacities 
of the developing child; thus, developmental psychology traditionally views 
intersubjectivity as an intrapersonal phenomenon. Differing from this traditional 
view, many authors emphasize that the development of interactional cognition is 
inextricable from social interactions all through the development (e.g., Reddy, 
2003; Rochat, 2007; Rochat & Passos-Ferreira, 2009; Rogoff, 1999; Vygotsky, 
1978). However, these views need not necessarily be incompatible because 
in both accounts, the developing intersubjectivity results from bidirectional 
interaction between a subject’s emotional and cognitive capacities and the social 
interaction processes that shape them. 
Human babies are socially oriented already at birth. Neonates display 
preference for faces, animate objects, and familiar voices (Rochat and Striano, 
2000; Trevarthen, 1998). Neonates are also susceptible to “emotional contagion” 
(Hatfield, et al., 1994) in the form of contagious cry (Sagi and Hoffman, 1976; 
Dondi, et al., 1999). Some actions, including mouth and finger movements, 
are mimicked (Meltzoff and Moore, 1977; Nagy, et al., 2005), although 
the existence of this tendency has recently been challenged (Oostenbroek, 
et al., 2016). The apparently born-with dispositions to attend to faces and 
to orient and copy others’ emotions and movements reflect the social 
attunement to others right from the birth (Trevarthen, 1979; Trevarthen and 
Aitken, 2001). Building on these predispositions, primary intersubjectivity 
emerges from ca. 6 weeks of age onwards. Infants respond to others’ 
communication rhythmically and coordinate their own actions multimodally 
(Rochat, et al., 2009; Trevarthen and Aitken, 2001). At 2 months, social 
smiling, rhythmic turn-taking in vocalizations and shared mutual gaze (Gergely 
and Watson, 1999; Stern, 1985) are provoked and supported by affective 
responses by a caretaker’s use of “motherese” and exaggerated facial 
expressions (Gergely and Watson 1999; Rochat 2001). Infants monitor the other’s 
responses to their gaze, limb movements, and emotional expressions, while 
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the exact amount of expected responsiveness depends on the general levels 
of social contingency that the infant is used to (Bigelow and Rochat, 2006). 
Notably, infants actively try to re-engage a previously engaged but now 
withdrawing adult interaction partner by using vocal, gestural, and facial 
communication, as shown by the still-face paradigm (Melinder, et al., 2010; 
Messman, et al., 2009; Tronick, et al., 1978). Moreover, during primary 
intersubjectivity infants already show anticipation of another’s actions: e.g., 
when mothers approached their infants to pick them up, they responded by 
increasing body tension and reaching out their arms (Reddy, et al., 2013). 
This may be understood as a basic form of understanding intentions, 
in the sense of intentions being perceivable and becoming manifest 
in goal-oriented action, which might play a role in the further development 
of understanding and attributing intentions as mental states. At this early 
stage, infants may also have an affective, non-representational account of self 
in the sense of being an object to others. This is arguably visible in infants’ 
coy behavior in response to interaction with familiar adults or seeing self 
in the mirror (Reddy, 2000). In sum, building on the strongly social 
predisposition endowed before birth, in primary intersubjectivity infants 
and caretakers are interacting in a dyadic frame, in which they attend 
to and regulate each other’s emotions and communicative expressions. 
However, infants might not only anticipate other’s actions directed at 
them, thus arguably showing a basic awareness and understanding of intentions 
as perceivable in action. Recent research into the emergence of Theory of 
Mind suggests that an implicit account of another’s belief-like states may be 
present already at this early stage, i.e., that infants distinguish situations of 
a protagonist having a false versus a true belief (Low and Perner, 2012; Rakoczy, 
2012; but see critique e.g., Ruffman, et al., 2012).
Nearing the first birthday, a child reaches the first stages of secondary 
intersubjectivity. Infants seek affective cues from the adult for how to respond 
in ambiguous situations, known as social referencing, which establishes 
the meaning of perceived things or events (Feinman, 1982; Striano and 
Rochat, 2000; but see for earlier emergence of social referencing: 
Vaillant-Molina & Bahrick, 2012). A child also begins to engage with another 
in triadic interaction about external objects in the form of joint attention. 
In joint attention, the infant and adult together focus their attention to 
an external object and gaze at each other in reference to the object (Striano 
and Rochat, 2000; Tomasello and Carpenter, 2007). Importantly, they keep 
track of the particular experiences shared with a person, point to share 
information of and to enquire about another’s response to an object, and 
produce sharing looks in gaze alternation with the facial expression 
conveying their attitude to the object (Liszkowski, et al., 2006). Further, they 
elaborate and persist with their gesturing in the case of unsatisfactory response 
and take the adult’s attentional state into account before pointing (Carpenter 
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and Liebal, 2011). Thus, at 12–14 months infants have the motivation and 
ability to share attention and interest with others towards a shared target 
and to engage in an emotionally satisfying interaction about this third pole 
of interaction.
At 18 months, infants complete others’ uncompleted actions, marking 
the transition to collaborative action in the sense of shared intentionality – that 
is, to actions that are completed together with knowledge of the common goal 
(Tomasello, et al., 2005). When a joint action breaks down, 18-month-olds 
actively try to re-engage their partners in the shared task, even when the partner 
is not needed for the child to complete the action. Compared to the 
re-engagement during primary intersubjectivity, which occurs within the 
dyadic communication frame, in secondary intersubjectivity the re-engagement 
extends to activity that involves a shared, external goal and involves also 
a mutual knowledge of the sharing (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007). Children 
do not view their collaborative partners merely as social tools for the 
achievement of their own goals, but rather, they enjoy the collaboration per se 
(Warneken, et al., 2012). Further, a child attaches rules to the ways reciprocal 
exchanges are to be acted and adjust them depending on whom they interact 
with (Zahavi and Rochat, 2015).
At 20–24 months, a child reaches tertiary intersubjectivity. Children gain 
understanding of self as a shared representation, being perceived simultaneously 
by oneself and by others (Rochat, et al., 2009). Children recognize themselves 
in the mirror (Johnson, 1983; Nielsen, et al., 2006), indicating an explicit 
self-recognition and self-objectification (Rochat and Zahavi, 2011). Joint 
attention develops further so that objects are not merely attended to but jointly 
evaluated via negotiation (Rochat, et al., 2009). Tertiary intersubjectivity also 
manifests in joint pretense play, which indicates that the child has access to 
symbolic references to possible worlds (Trevarthen, 1998). More complex 
self-conscious emotions, abiding to rules and testing them, and participating 
in jointly imagined games with others reveal the advanced cognitive potential 
and the keen motivation to partake in the conduct of the social world. Tertiary 
intersubjectivity thus allows an understanding of self in relation to others and 
as part of a larger social context. At this stage, children also reach an important 
milestone in intersubjectivity: they gain the command of language, which 
increases dramatically their control and use of communicative interactions.
Zahavi and Rochat (2015) group the later developmental achievements 
together with tertiary intersubjectivity. However, as they presumably require 
more advanced emotio-cognitive mechanisms than what is available for 
two-year-olds, we label an additional, quaternary level of intersubjectivity. 
By 6–7 years of age, shared intentionality has become collective intentionality 
(Tomasello, 2014). Children are highly sensitive to what others think of them, 
internalize group rules and norms, and apply them in their social interactions. 
Behavioral rules have a ritualistic quality: they are sanctioned by collective 
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norms (Zahavi and Rochat, 2015). Children identify with their group and 
employ ostracism and social rejection to affirm one’s own group affiliation and 
identity (Nesdale, 2008). The quaternary level of intersubjectivity thus illustrates 
the child’s motivation and capacity to interact as a part of a larger, 
normatively regulated group with collective norms and regulation thereof. 
Gaining a command of normativity is strongly manifested in and through 
language use, for example, in the form of narrative practice (Gallager and Hutto, 
2008) or verbally explicated rules of behavior (Lagattuta, 2005).
A complementary view: Three domains of social interaction 
As a complementary approach, we will consider three parallel domains 
of social interaction, characterized by affective, deontic, and epistemic 
aspects of participants’ interactional behavior. The framework draws on 
an earlier proposal by Stevanovic and Peräkylä (2014), according to which 
the momentary relationship between the interaction participants can be 
described with reference to three different aspects of that relationship: affect, 
power, and knowledge, each of which pertains to the specific ways in which 
people may design their actions to be recognizable as such by others. Due to 
human adults arguably orienting to these three aspects of their momentary 
relationships as somewhat stable, predictable, and normatively accountable, 
the authors suggested that the organization of human action in general is 
embedded in three orders of social relations: emotional order, deontic order, and 
epistemic order. Here, we will apply the framework to discuss intersubjective 
processes more generally.
Although each of these three orders may be considered to be relevant 
to all adult human social interaction, the participants may still treat one of 
them as more salient than the other two. This tendency is reflected in many 
classifications in the philosophy of language. According to Bühler (2011 
[1934]), there are three basic linguistic functions: expression, steering or 
appeal, and representation. Each of these functions may be argued to make 
relevant a different aspect of the participants’ momentary relationship: expression 
the emotional aspect, steering or appeal the deontic aspect, and representation 
the epistemic aspect (Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2014: 186). Bühler’s categories 
also reverberate in Jakobson’s (1960) idea of the phatic, conative, and referential 
communication functions and in Searle’s (1976) thoughts about the expressive, 
directive, and assertive illocutionary speech acts. Furthermore, the three orders 
seem to agree also with Tomasello’s (2008) theory, according to which all 
human social interaction is underpinned by three basic human communicative 
motives: sharing, requesting, and informing. In sum, it seems that the variance 
in the relative weights of the affect-, power-, and knowledge-related aspects 
of social interaction is a major motivator driving classifications of social action.
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In this paper, we bring the three-order framework into discussion with 
the developmental psychological literature on the emergence of capacities 
for intersubjectivity. For this purpose, we will make certain modifications to 
the framework so as to adapt it to the analysis of interactions with human 
infants and children, where the norms and structures of social interaction 
are not yet (fully) oriented to by the participants (e.g., Stivers, et al., 2018). 
Essentially, we will draw on a combination of enactivistic and conversation-
analytic ideas (see De Jaegher, et al., 2016) to outline a potential bridge 
between analyzing the emergent interactional processes, in which also human 
infants may participate in, and studying the normative structures of social 
interaction that inform human adult interaction. For this reason, we also refer 
to the three components of our framework as domains, and not as orders. 
In our vocabulary, the affective, deontic and epistemic aspects of interactional 
behavior and the respective orders of social relations are bound together by 
the notion of orientation. It is only when the participants begin to orient 
to certain patterns in the affective, deontic and epistemic aspects of their own 
and each other’s behavior as normatively expected that the “domains” transform 
into “orders.” 
In the following, we will discuss each of the above-mentioned domains 
separately, while also revisiting and further elaborating those features of social 
interaction that were crucial in the previously described “levels” framework. 
In so doing, we will end up with a cross-sectional description of 
the intersubjective processes, in which we will differentiate various aspects 
of interaction across multiple levels and domains and which we hope to serve 
as a heuristic device in helping to navigate the complexity of intersubjective 
phenomena in future research endeavors.
Affective domain 
According to Stevanovic and Peräkylä (2014), social interaction is 
anchored in what they refer to as the “emotional order,” which consists of 
the “socio-cultural, personal, and local expectations concerning the expression 
of affect within a momentary relationship of interacting participants” (p. 192) 
and which can be used as a resource when designing one’s utterances and 
expressions. Since we are, however, adapting the framework to the analysis of 
early human interaction, we will shift our focus from the already established 
normative expectations for emotional expression to those affective aspects 
of social interaction that play an important role in shaping the participants’ 
momentary relationship locally. Repeated exposure to the patterns formed by 
these affective aspects of interaction will then, arguably, lead the developing 
human infant, later on, to orient to these patterns as more or less normatively 
expected – given the specific affective relationship context of interaction. 
As reviewed above, research of human infants has long emphasized 
the importance of early affective resonance processes as a scaffolding for 
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the development of the individual’s further intersubjective capacities. Emotional 
contagion (Dondi, et al. 1999; Sagi and Hoffman, 1976) has been suggested 
to affect the emotional experience of the mimicking person (Chartrand and 
Bargh, 1999). This is considered to happen independently of that person’s 
cognitive ability to represent another’s mental states (Barresi and Moore, 2008). 
It is thus “in the guise of emotional contagion” (Brinck, 2008) that we may 
observe the emergence of what Stern (1985: 132) referred to as “interaffectivity,” 
consisting of an individual matching its own “feeling state as experiences within” 
with the feeling state “seen ‘on’ or ‘in’ another” (1985: 132).
Importantly, however, typically developing human infants have, not only 
the capacity to transmit and resonate with emotions, but also a fundamental 
desire to share their emotional experiences with others and to become swept 
along by the emotional experiences of others (Feinman, 1982; Hobson and 
Hobson, 2008; Meltzoff and Brooks, 2001; Reddy 2003; Rochat, et al., 2009; 
Trevarthen and Hubley, 1978; Trevarthen and Aitken, 2001). The early interaction 
of human infants and their caretakers takes place in an intense affective frame, 
where the participants engage in rhythmic, multimodal emotion displays, smile 
at each other and maintain mutual gaze (Gergely and Watson, 1999; Trevarthen 
and Aitken 2001; Rochat et al. 2009). Here, the heightened positive affect 
that often accompanies emotional sharing may increase the likelihood of, 
and desire for, further instances of such sharing (Hobson and Hobson, 2008; 
Messman, et al., 2009; Tronick, et al., 1978). The motivation to share experiences 
becomes even more apparent later in human ontogeny by the commence of 
triadic interaction, with the infants producing sharing looks, alternating their 
gaze between the co-participant and the object of interest, while expressing their 
attitude toward the object with their facial expressions (Hobson and Hobson 
2008; Liszkowski, et al., 2006). The human extraordinary motivation to share 
experiences has been argued to underlie all the ensuing fundamental steps in 
the human intersubjective development (Stern, 1985; Tomasello, et al., 2005).
Affectivity also becomes socially regulated from early on. On a local scale, 
the social regulation of affect involves influencing the current affective state 
of the partner directly (e.g., sharing joy, soothing) (Stern, 1985; Tronick, et al., 
1978). Importantly, however, such regulation occurs also on a larger scale, as 
infants learn to know about the opportunities and consequences of emotional 
sharing and develop relatively stable strategies, such as “attachments styles” 
(Ainsworth, et al., 1978; Bowlby, 1982 [1969]). For example, at 8–12 months, 
human infants begin to smile in anticipation of sharing an event with a social 
partner, thus indexing “an intersubjective sense of the social partner as someone 
with whom experiences can be shared” (Venezia, et al., 2004: 404). Overall, 
the social context has a facilitating or hindering effect on our wish to share 
emotions with others (Wagner and Smith, 1991; Zeman and Garber, 1996). 
The development of the social regulation of affectivity goes along with 
the internalization of culture-specific rules on the appropriateness of different 
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kinds of emotional expressions in different social situations (Hochschild, 1979, 
1983), and even in different locations within the moment-by-moment unfolding 
of interactional sequences (Sorjonen and Peräkylä, 2012). Thus, to give 
an example from adult interaction, the recipients of complaint stories and 
news deliveries are more likely to produce their emotional responses at 
the completion of the news delivery or narrative than immediately after 
the tellers’ emotional displays (Maynard and Freese, 2012).
From a group-level perspective, the social regulation of affective sharing is 
needed, not only to avoid personal experiences of embarrassment, but also to 
manage social groups. There is evidence of an ingroup advantage in emotion 
recognition both in terms of decoding speed and accuracy (Elfenbein, et al., 
2007; Marsh, et al., 2003), which suggests that emotional expressions play 
a significant role as indicators of membership and socialization in social units, 
such as teams, groups, communities, nations, and cultures (von Scheve, 2012). 
The heightened intersubjectivity in the form of “collective effervescence” 
(Collins, 2004; Durkheim, 2001 [1912]) is an incisive demonstration of 
the power of affective orientations as social glue binding a large group of 
individuals together.
Importantly, as will be suggested later when we explore the interplay 
between the levels and domains (see the next section), the social regulation of 
affectivity operates also through language. While the narrative practice allows 
humans to pass on judgments on how people should or should not behave 
in specific situations (Gallagher and Hutto, 2008), some of these judgments 
concern the matter of emotional expression in different situations. Language use 
thus accounts for the essential features of a uniquely human-like social order.
Deontic domain 
What Stevanovic and Peräkylä (2014) referred to as the “deontic order” 
captures another aspect of the participants’ momentary relationship that is, 
arguably, built-in in the organization of human action. This aspect has to do with 
power, control, and agency – the rights of an individual to determine action. 
Conversation-analytic research on the normative structures of human adult 
interaction is based on the idea of participants constantly posing constraints on 
each other’s actions (Heritage, 1984: 245–53; Schegloff, 2007: 20–21). Still, 
the rights to do so may be distributed unequally, which is apparent, for example, 
in the pre-allocated turn-taking systems of certain institutional interactions, such 
as the ones in court or classroom (Atkinson & Drew, 1979; Macbeth, 1991). 
People also orient to asymmetries in their rights to make overt requests for 
specific future actions (Heinemann, 2006) or decisions about them (Stevanovic 
& Peräkylä, 2012). The deontic order thus is essentially about what an individual 
can rightfully expect from others and what others can from him or her, as well 
as about how such expectations may be established.
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While the deontic order may be argued to account for certain phenomena 
in adult interaction, this is hardly true for interaction between young infants 
and their caretakers. Still, the first antecedents of deontic orientations may be 
seen to emerge early on. At 2 months, the early infant-caretaker interactions 
start to indicate contingency in the emotional expression (Rochat and Passos-
Ferreira, 2009). For example, infants develop expectations of another’s targeted 
movement (Reddy, et al., 2013) and accomplish interactional bids through smiles 
and eye-contact (Meltzoff and Moore, 1977; Rochat, 2001; Sagi and Hoffman, 
1976). At 3 months, they begin to actively call others’ attention to themselves, 
as it were, to initiate joint action (Reddy, 2003). At 4 months, when an adult 
tries to establish eye contact with the infant, the infant treats it as an invitation 
to joint action and expects that the adult’s ensuing vocal, facial, and gestural 
moves will be of concern to him (Brinck, 2008). All this points to an emerging 
capacity of the human infant to predict the behaviors of others – something that, 
we argue, is the first step in the process of the infant also beginning to grasp how 
actions should unfold.
How does normativity then sneak in into early interaction? For a large 
part, this is accomplished by the caretaker, who treats the infant as if he or she 
were a competent interaction participant (Trevarthen, 1979). The caretaker may 
treat, for example, the infant’s random hand movements as intentional and let 
it have a causal role in effectuating a change in the caretaker’s subsequent 
behavior (Rączaszek-Leonardi, et al., 2013). Furthermore, when imitating 
the behavior of their infants, the caretakers have been found to exaggerate 
their behavior by using movement of the head and the face, thus possibly 
motivating the infant to produce further similar vocalizations (Nomikou and 
Rohlfing, 2011: 126; Papoušek and Papoušek, 1989: 149). As a result, jointly 
created interactional patterns emerge where the infants seem to be able to 
place their own vocalizations exactly at the right time and even at the right 
pitch (Malloch, 2000). It has also been well established that a rise in pitch in 
infant-directed speech makes it more likely that the infant shifts his or her 
gaze – a mechanism that may be used by the caretaker to solicit turn-taking 
(Papoušek, et al., 1991; Rossmanith, et al., 2014: 11; Stern, et al., 1982). 
In this way, regularities emerge from the interaction itself and these, in turn, 
constrain the way in which the next action is expected to take place. To use 
the terms of enactivism, the participants co-regulate their activity in ways 
that sustain the interaction itself, thus giving rise to a certain autonomy of 
interaction over the individual participants (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007).
The co-regulation of activity is something that infants and their 
caretakers engage in repeatedly. Such co-regulation involves the sharing of 
excitement and enacting the structure, shape, and dynamics of joint action 
(Rączaszek-Leonardi, et al., 2013). As for the structural aspects of action, 
infants learn about the temporal patterning and “chunking” of actions into 
distinguishable events (Nomikou and Rohlfing, 2011), as well as about the ways 
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in which actions are chained into wider sequences of action (Rossmanith, et 
al. 2014). In moving through the joint action sequences together, infants get to 
know about the effects that their own actions have on the partner and 
the unfolding of the activity, and they learn to anticipate such effects (Hunnius 
and Bekkering, 2010). This opens up the way to “situational normativity” 
(Rietveld, 2008) associated with specific interpersonal routines and practices 
– repetitive “predictable formats of interaction” (Bruner, 1985: 31). Once 
established, the structures of joint action lend themselves to be played with, for 
example, for the purposes of teasing (Rossmanith, et al., 2014: 19). Gradually, 
over time, the routines develop into more conventionalized rituals (Bruner, 
1985). By constraining interactions in less idiosyncratic ways, more complex 
forms of joint action with different constellations of participants not previously 
familiar to each other become possible (Rączaszek-Leonardi, et al., 2013: 216). 
Such development can be seen to culminate in the mastery of the complex 
conventionalized “interaction rituals” (Collins, 2004; Goffman, 1967) that 
characterize adult conversational interactions.
Research on adult interactions has shown that the expectations of 
behavior are not an innocent matter of probability but an issue permeated 
by morality: if the projected next action is not provided, it becomes morally 
accountable (Heritage, 1984: 245–292). The first instantiation of human 
infants orienting to the moral obligations of a person to fill those expectations 
that others have for their behavior may be observed very early on. From two 
months of age, infants have been observed to get upset when their caretaker’s 
face becomes unresponsive (Tronick, et al., 1978) or when their partner’s 
behavior shows little indications of contingency (Murray and Trevarthen, 
1985). First, such expressions of distress may simply reflect the child’s personal 
preferences for certain actions over others (Darwall, 2006; Rakoczy, et al., 2008). 
It is only significantly later, at around three years of age, that there is evidence 
for children beginning to understand norms from a third-person perspective, in 
a more general and timeless manner; this is when children start to intervene in 
situations in which a third party is harmed (Vaish, et al., 2011). This is when 
they also start to demonstrate commitment to joint action that goes beyond their 
self-interest (Gräfenhain, et al., 2013; Hamann, et al., 2012), thus displaying 
readiness to fill the expectations that others have for them, independent of 
their personal preferences. About two years later, children have been shown 
to intervene when there is no concrete harm caused for anybody – just to set 
conventional norms right (Rakoczy, et al., 2008). This suggests that, by now, 
children recognize social norms to be general, agent-neutral expectations 
that represent an implicit agreement as to how one should behave (Tomasello 
and Vaish, 2013). Later, of course, children acquire a more nuanced grasp of 
the possible differences in how individuals may relate to specific norms (see 
e.g., Jordan, et al., 2014). Not everybody needs or has the right to behave in 
the same way – a differentiation that explains much of the hierarchies of power.
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Expectation-based norms foreshadow morality also in the sense of 
an individual judging someone or some act as good or bad. Indeed, any 
disapproval of a harmful act or an approval of a cooperative act – especially 
when provided by a third disinterested party – may be argued to play a role 
in transforming an expectation-based norm into a moral norm. It is here in 
particular that deontic orientations are maintained also through language. 
As pointed out in the context of our discussion of affective orientations, 
narrative practice allows humans to pass on judgments on how people 
should or should not behave in specific situations (Gallagher and Hutto, 
2008). Also, the mere language-afforded possibility of labelling chunks of 
behavior has been argued to invoke action-related rights and obligations 
for which people are explicitly accountable (Enfield and Sidnell, 2017). 
Language use thus plays an important role in enabling a relative stability of 
many deontic orientations in adult social interaction.
Epistemic domain 
The so-called “epistemic order” consists of an “open-ended series of 
connections between people – connections that have to do with knowledge” 
(Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2014: 188–189). These connections are constantly 
at stake when two or more people are interacting with each other. What we 
think others do and do not know informs the way we design our utterances and 
interpret others’ utterances as actions. As has been pointed out by conversation 
analysts, many actions, such as assessments (Heritage & Raymond, 2005) and 
complaints (Heritage, 2011), which apparently are not about knowledge, are still 
frequently performed in ways that put the participants in different positions 
vis-à-vis their knowledge about what is being talked about. 
We suggest that the emergence of orientations to “knowledge” – that is, to 
a shared world of persons, inanimate objects and abstract concepts  –  is based 
on the co-regulation of action that also underlies the previously-discussed 
deontic orientations. More specifically, we postulate that as soon as children 
are capable of participating in action coordination that allows joint attention 
(Tomasello, 1999), the building of a shared world of knowledge may 
begin. However, the question when exactly this happens is a matter of some 
controversy. Experimental literature on gaze following and gaze checking 
suggests that infants’ epistemic orientations emerge by around 9 months of age, 
when they become referential beyond the dyadic exchanges, which happens, 
for example, when an infant points to a distant object to guide his or her 
caretaker’s attention toward it (Scaife and Bruner, 1975; Trevarthen and 
Aitken, 2001; Trevarthen and Hubley, 1978). Yet, literature focusing on 
multiple modalities, and not only on the visual domain, has indicated that joint 
attention coordination, at least in terms of experience sharing and mutual 
orientation, can occur much earlier than that. In a longitudinal study, 
Rossmanith and colleagues (2014) examined “book sharing” as one of 
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the earliest coordinated joint engagements with a complex object, occurring 
from as early as 3 months. As the researchers pointed out in their discussion of 
this finding, in book sharing, the triad between the infant, caregiver, and 
world is held together in a small confined space. The close encounters of 
book sharing allow the finger pointing and the object pointed at to meet 
within the infant’s reach. Orientations to shared meanings for things and 
events emerge when the child’s object-targeted actions are repeatedly embedded 
by the caretaker into culturally shaped episodes of joint intentionality 
(Rączaszek-Leonardi, et al., 2013). 
There are various types of shared meanings for things and events, 
the development of which joint coordinated engagements enable. At least in 
the beginning, such meanings may be largely emotional, as evidenced in 
the empirical studies on social referencing, which have shown infants to be able 
to use the links between the emotional expressions of others and specific objects 
as a guide for their behavior (e.g., Hornick, et al., 1987; Walden and Ogan, 
1988). Immersion into the structural dynamics of joint action then provides 
the opportunity for the infant to get a grasp of purposeful activities 
(Rączaszek-Leonardi, et al., 2013: 210–211), as well as of those very 
social agents who design these activities (Rossmanith, et al., 2014: 19). 
Furthermore, when two participants display joint attention toward a particular 
object, it is not only the object that becomes a part of the participants’ shared 
world but also the particular way in which that object is being referred to. 
Thus, during the instances of joint attention, children have been argued to 
develop a capacity for dual representation, where communicative gestures 
stand for and become the sign of something else (e.g., a pointing gesture 
as standing for a thing out there to be shared with others) (Rochat, et al., 
2009). According to this hypothetical idea, it is precisely the capacity of 
dual representation that opens the gate of symbolic development in terms 
of language acquisition (Akhtar and Gernsbacher, 2007; Smith, et al., 1988; 
Tomasello and Farrar, 1986). The new types of shared meanings afforded by 
language – including the abstract concepts, for example, for different states 
of knowledge and belief, for various actions and norms, and for rules of 
emotional expression – then drive not only the development of 
the full-blown epistemic order but also those in the deontic and affective domains.
The shared world of knowledge – the so-called “common ground” (Clark, 
1996; Enfield, 2006; Stalnaker, 2002; Tomasello 2008) – is an essential 
precondition for any human-like social interaction. The common ground makes 
it possible for people to refer to persons, places, objects, and events in ways 
that allow others to recognize who or what is being talked about (Enfield 
and Stivers, 2007). Besides aiding referential communication, the common 
ground has important consequences in the realm of social relationships, 
where people attribute much value to the sharedness of information (Enfield, 
2006). Consequently, epistemic orientations are crucial also from the point 
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of view of group-membership. Members of certain communities may treat 
their “ownership” of particular forms of knowledge as the defining 
characteristic of their community (Knorr-Cetina, 1999; Sharrock, 1974). 
From this point of view, children’s attempts in the triadic infant-adult-object 
encounters may be perceived primarily as attempts to create and expand that 
common ground (Tomasello, 1999) – something that, in the end, gives them 
something to talk about (Schaffer, 1984). 
Summary: A synthesis of the levels and domains 
The cross-sectional approach to the intersubjective processes in terms of 
a synthesis of the developmental levels of intersubjectivity and the three 
domains of social interaction is summarized in Figure 1.
While the organization of the levels of intersubjectivity is hierarchical in 
that each level builds on an earlier one, the domains of social interaction are 
Figure 1. A schematic representation of the cross-sectioning levels and modules of intersubjectivity. 
The arrows indicate the flow of some important developmental directions that characterize neurotypical human 
intersubjectivity.
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more or less parallel, having their own distinctive characteristics. The affective 
domain is based on processes that lean onto the initial predispositions to social 
interaction and, while subject to cognitive and social regulation after early 
infancy, remain at least partly sub-conscious (e.g., emotional contagion in 
adults: Singer & Lamm, 2009). An essential characteristic of deontic orientation 
is that it is constituted by specific forms of action control that develop 
through concrete interactions and thus can only be learned in interactions with 
other people. The epistemic domain, then again, revolves around people’s 
shared cognitive representations of their surrounding world. Despite their 
distinctive characteristics, we may assume that these three domains are not 
independent of each other but that they support each other in specific ways. 
The precise ways in which these, and potentially other, orientations exist in 
interaction and regulate one another, is a question that continues to be pursued 
(see e.g., Ekberg & LeCouteur, 2015; Landmark, et al., 2015; Lindström 
& Weatherall, 2015; Stevanovic, 2013). What is new here, however, is our 
proposal that there are crucial processes taking place on a third axis, i.e., 
a flow of influence running through the levels and domains diagonally. 
Initially, during the primary level of intersubjectivity, the direction of 
influence runs from the affective orientations toward the deontic orientations, 
and, from there, toward the epistemic orientations. That is, the affective 
scaffolding of interaction provides a framework where an infant may develop 
expectations as to how the other is going to behave next, while the capacity to 
anticipate other’s reaction in turn is the foundation for the infant to be able to 
make bids of joint attention, which is crucial for the development of epistemic 
orientations. However, during secondary intersubjectivity, by the acquisition 
of language, the direction of the flow of influence changes: now it is 
the capacities in the domain of epistemic orientations, such as knowledge of 
who one is in relation to others, that drive the development of capacities in 
the deontic domain, where infants learn to adjust their normative expectations 
to take into account such knowledge. Furthermore, the increasingly detailed 
understanding of the norms that govern social life have an influence also 
on the orientation in the affective domain, so that the primitive reciprocity 
that characterized early interactions gives way to adherence to different kinds 
of emotion display rules. As a result, a mutual smile between a mother and 
a baby is quite different from a mutual smile, say, between Donald Trump and 
Angela Merkel – despite the apparent similarity of these two interactional events. 
In our view, it is this particular right-angled-bracket (>) shaped pattern in 
the flow of influence between the different levels of intersubjectivity and 
domains of interaction that best accounts for the specificity and complexity of 
human intersubjectivity in interaction. As becomes obvious when considering 
the top-left corner of the table, affective orientations are the most central 
driving force behind all the intersubjective capacities and processes. After 
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a certain point, however, language, as a transpersonal “all-engulfing continent,” 
in which all of us are immersed (Coelho & Figueiredo, 2003: 199), takes on 
the role of equal importance (e.g., Zlatev, 2008).
Implications for research 
After having proposed a novel approach to differentiate various aspects of 
interactional behavior across multiple levels and domains of interaction, we will 
suggest some ways in which this approach could benefit our understanding of 
the fine-scale social interaction processes and guide future research efforts.
First, the proposed approach helps to conceptualize the variation in 
the intersubjective processes in the course of the moment-to-moment 
unfolding of social action. Although all the domains and levels of 
intersubjectivity are presumably available for participants in mature human 
social interactions, particular aspects of intersubjectivity may dominate 
the interaction at a given point. For example, the domain of affective 
orientations may be emphasized during episodes of greeting and farewell, 
requiring either a very “low level” affect sharing or, depending on the context, 
cognitively more complex processing of affect that is selective and normatively 
regulated. As another example, the domain of deontic intersubjective 
orientations may dominate during complex collaborative interactions extending 
the constraints of the here-and-now among the participants, which again may 
involve cognitively more demanding processes of group norm sensitivity 
or power relationship representations or remain less cognitively taxing. 
In addition, our approach may help to account for instances of ambiguity 
in social interaction, which are particularly frequent at the intersection of 
domains of affective and epistemic orientations. The participants may, for 
example, have different understandings of whether an utterance, such as 
That place is really far away, should be heard as a delivery of new information 
and thus responded to with knowledge-oriented utterances (e.g., Is it? or 
I know, I’ve been there), or whether the same utterance should be 
interpreted as an affective evaluation and thus responded to with 
an analogous evaluation indicating the sharing of affect (e.g., Indeed, it 
takes an eternity to get there). Our approach will therefore help empirical 
interaction researchers to conceptualize the ways in which intersubjective 
orientations change from moment-to-moment in social interaction, while 
there may also be discrepancies in how the participants treat the centrality of 
a given domain for what the participants are momentarily up to. Furthermore, 
the suggested insights on the emergence of intersubjective orientations in early 
infancy may also contribute to a more nuanced understanding of how adult 
interactions are regulated – in particular with regard to the non-normative 
aspects of interaction.
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Second, the synthesis of the “level” and “domain” approaches to 
intersubjectivity provides a unified framework to take a fresh look at empirical 
interactional data to consider how intersubjective processes actually develop. 
The above developmental account is based on the generally accepted milestones 
in development as seen in developmental psychology, while the details of 
the development may well vary both individually and culturally (e.g., Kärtner, 
et al., 2011; Keller & Otto, 2009; Reddy, et al., 2013). Moreover, the approach 
we propose can aid in yielding a more detailed understanding of intersubjective 
processes in individuals belonging to different clinical groups. Emphasizing 
the centrality of affective orientations, our model is well in line with literature 
on autism spectrum disorders (ASD), which points to a specific lack of 
emotional reciprocity that individuals with ASD experience in relation to each 
other and see it as an underlying mechanism behind the profound social 
impairments that define ASD (see e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1987; Hobson and 
Hobson, 2008; Hobson and Meyer, 2005; Kasari, et al., 1990). Notably, 
however, according to the so-called social motivation hypothesis, many of 
the social impairments evident in ASD are not fundamental but rather 
secondary to a primary impairment in social motivation, which results in failure 
to attend to and generalize representations of the reward value of social stimuli 
(Dawson, 2008). These views suggest that there are different mechanisms 
underlying and possibly influencing the development of ASD – something 
that fits well with the status of ASD as a highly heterogeneous group 
of disorders. 
Third, our approach provides tools for the study of intersubjectivity in 
non-human animals. While intersubjectivity is widely considered as a uniquely 
human characteristic (see e.g., Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003), our nearest living 
relatives, chimpanzees, exhibit impressive socio-cognitive skills and master 
many of the processes seen in human infants, so such a view may not be 
entirely warranted. Clearly, chimpanzees lack intersubjectivity as a language-
mediated, collective, and norm-regulated process of interaction directly 
comparable to adult humans. Yet, they possess some of the capacities that mark 
the first three levels of human intersubjectivity in each domain. Chimpanzees’ 
affective orientations are arguably highly similar to that of humans in terms 
of emotional contagion (Kano, et al. 2016; Parr, 2001), and their early 
developmental stages have been claimed to be indistinguishable from that 
in humans (Bard, 2012). At the higher levels of affective orientations, whether 
or not chimpanzees engage in joint attention or not is debated (Carpenter 
& Call, 2013; Leavens, et al., 2005; Leavens and Racine, 2009). As for 
the deontic orientations, chimpanzees clearly exhibit behavioral expectations 
that take relationship attributes such as rank and friendships among group 
members into account (e.g., Slocombe & Zuberbuehler, 2007) and exceed 
rules learnt from interactions in specific pairings, including expectations 
of reward distribution and social conduct (Brosnan & de Waal, 2014; Rudolf von 
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Rohr, et al., 2015; for bonobos, see Clay, et al., 2016). Furthermore, and quite 
intriguingly, recent studies show that bonobos, a sister species of chimpanzees, 
engage in fast-paced communicative interactions organized in adjacency 
pairs (Rossano, 2013), and their gestural communicative exchanges resemble 
cooperative turn-taking (Fröhlich, et al., 2016). Still, generally, they have 
a weak or absent orientation to accountability in terms of third-party 
punishment, which clearly makes them different from humans (see Riedl, et 
al., 2012). Finally, regarding the epistemic orientations, chimpanzees know 
what others see and hear and this leads to the use of others as sources of 
information in ambiguous situations. While chimpanzees appear unable 
to understand others’ explicit false beliefs (Call & Tomasello, 2008), they 
pass implicit false-belief tests (Buttelman, et al., 2017; Krupenye, et al., 
2016), similarly to infants under two years of age (reviewed by Scott & 
Baillargeon, 2017). Altogether it is suggested that the differences in human and 
chimpanzee intersubjectivity appear to stem from the absence of a “we-mind” 
and, consequently, absence of a mindset of collectivity (Bullinger, et al., 
2016;  Tomasello, 2014; Tomasello, et al., 2005; 2012; Tomasello & Rakoczy, 
2003), despite the early stages of affective, deontic, and epistemic orientations 
being to some extent comparable to those of humans. However, studies on 
primates as well as other species, such as dogs, wolves, and corvids, reveal that 
the boundaries between humans’ and other species’ intersubjectivity are 
increasingly blurry, and future research could point to new aspects in what 
distinguishes the intersubjectivity processes characteristic for humans from 
those of other species. We hope that the ideas proposed in this paper will 
prompt further research in this domain of inquiry, too.
Finally, the paper seeks to foster future efforts of interdisciplinary 
dialogue. We wish that our model will help researchers to grasp what aspects of 
social interaction different empirical research approaches are actually looking 
at and, as a result, to better relate these approaches to each other. In other 
words, we hope that the paper will also turn out to advance the processes of 
intersubjectivity – within academia.
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